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under his control. He has a constitutional right, derived from several
constitutional
sources, to give the
Helpful
fad-finder his own testimony.2 He
also has the right under the sixth
amendment's compulsory processs
clause to require the appearance of
any witness to give testimony. 3 If
the defendant is an indigent and if a
proper showing is made, he has access at government expense to inThe Right to Evidence
vestigative and expert assistance
and testimony. 4
BENNETT L. GERSHMAN*
Some evidence, although in the
White Plains
prosecutor's possession and control,
may also be accessible to a defendant. Prosecution witnesses, assumALTHOUGH ITS theoretical basis
ing they are known by the defense,
may be disputed, nobody questions
can be interviewed before trialS and
the proposition that a person charg6
ed with a crime has a constitutional cross-examined during trial.
right to present a defense,1 Present- Discovery rules enable a defendant
to examine before trial a broad aring a defense naturally requires acray of tangible evidence.7 Also access to proof. Access includes not
only the availability of evidence, cessible is any materially exculpatory information in the prosecutor's
but also its permissible use. Con8 Given the variety of
possession.
sider some examples: A defendant
evidentiary
and procedural safewants to testify, but his lawyer's
guards surrounding the fact-finding
threats drive him off the stand. A
witness who might be expected to process, and assuming unobstructed
give favorable testimony for the de- access to evidence, our adversary
system might be expected to profense appears at trial but refuses to
duce reliable and fair results. Such is
testify. A defense witness wants to
often not the case, however. Bartestify, but because the defendant
riers exist that obstruct a
failed to notify the prosecutor about
the witness, is precluded from giv- defendant's access to proof.
Although common law rules dising such proof. Evidence that might
qualifying a defendant from testifyexculpate a defendant has been suping have been abolished,9 restricpressed by the prosecutor, or has
tions upon the defendant's own tesbeen lost or destroyed by the police.
timony exist. Relevancy and reliaThe evidence in all of these cases as
bility considerations limit a defena practical matter is inaccessible to
dant's ability to offer his own testisupport the defense. Does the defenmony. If reasonable, such restricdant have any remedy? This article
tions probably will be upheld. In
discusses the types of evidence that
Nix v. Whiteside,lO for example, a
theoretically are accessible to a
defendant was prevented from testidefendant, some of the practical and
fying when his attorney threatened
legal barriers that can obstruct a
to expose anticipated falsehoods.
defendant's access to such proof,
No constitutional right of the defenand the constitutional protections
dant was infringed, the Supreme
afforded a defendant if access is imCourt concluded, because although
permissibly denied .
a defendant has a right to testify, he
A defendant supposedly has
has no right to testify falsely, nor a
broad, constitutionally-guaranteed
access to evidence to prove his de- right to the assistance of an attorney
fense. Some of this evidence may be to abet that plan. In a close decision,
the Court recently struck down a
in the defendant's possession or
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ruling by a state court restricting on
reliability grounds a defendant's
hypnotically-refreshed testimony.
In Rock v. Arkansas,l1 the defendant underwent hypnosis to refresh
her memory about the details of her
shooting her husband. She sought to
testify to facts she remembered as a
result of the hypnosis but the court
would not permit her testimony,
concluding that hypnotically refreshed testimony was inherently
unreliable and therefore per se inadmissible. The Supreme Court held
this to be constitutional error.
Although a state may impose reasonable restrictions on the presentation of evidence, the Courtrtoted,
the absolute barring of a defendant's
post-hypnotic testimony was "arbitrary and disproportionate" to the
purposes behind the state's evidentiary safeguards,12 The testimony
could have been restricted had the

• Professor of Law, Pace University ..
Compare Westen, The Co/Jipulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 127-131
(1974) (Compulsory Process Clause as basis
for the right to present a defense) with Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An
Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in
Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 713, 793
(1976) (spirit and history of Bill of Rights as
basis for such right).
2 Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2709
(1987); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
819 n. 15 (1975); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,
273 (1948). But see People v. Washington, 71
N.Y. 2d 916,521 N.Y.S. 2d 531,523 N.E. 2d
818 (1988).
3 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19
(1967); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 107. S. Ct.
989(1987). But see People v. Gisendanner, 48
N.Y. 2d 543,423 N.Y.S. 2d 893,399 N.E. 2d
925 (1979).
4 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). See
N.Y. County Law § 722-C.
S United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225
(1975).

1

Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974);
Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
7 Fed R. Crim. P. 16; N.Y. Crim. Proc. L.
art. 240.
8 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963);
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
9 Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570,
573-582 (1961).
10 475 U.S. 157 (1986).

6

11

12

107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987).
Id. at 2711.
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lower court made specific, caserelated findings of unreliability.
A defendant has a constitutional
right of access to the testimony of
defense witnesses unimpeded by arbitrary barriers. In Washington v.
Texas,B for example, the Supreme
Court struck down a statute that
prevented persons charged as accomplices from testifying for one
another. By preventing a defendant
from access to his accomplice's testimony, the Court observed, "the
State arbitrarily denied him the
right to put on the stand a witness
who was physically and mentally
capable of testifying to events that
he had personally observed, and
whose testimony would have been
relevant and material to the
defense."14 However, preclusion of
the testimony of a defense witness as
a sanction for his attorney's failure
to comply with a pretri(l.l discovery
request by the prosecutor did not infringe upon the defendant's constitution(l.l right to compulsory process
or due process. In Taylor v.
Illinois,15 the Supreme Court helq
that barring defense evidence,
although a "drastic" sanction, is appropriate when the discovery violation is "willful and blatant" and
"motivated by a desire to obtain a
tactical advantage that would minimize the effectiveness of crossexamination and the ability to adduce rebuttal evidence."16 Here the
Court visited the sins of defense
counsel \lpon the client, depriving
the latter of evidence that might
have exonerated him.
Rules of evidence may deny a
def~ndant access to relevant witness
testimony. In Chambers v. Mississippi,17 the state's hearsay rule
coupled with its "voucher(' rule prevented a defendant charged with
murder from introducing testimony
from a witness who previously had
confessed to the killing. Since there
was no showing that the proposed
testimony was unreliable, applying
the above rules of evidence to deny
the defendant access to this exculpatory testimony was held to be fun-

damentally unfair' and a denial of
due process. Had these archaic rules
not been so skewed against the
defendant, the result probably
would have been different. Similarly, a defendant was denied the right
to confront his accuser when he was
prevented from using confidential
juvenile court records to crossexamine the prosecution's principal
witness. Defense access to such information, the Supreme Court held
in Davis v. Alaska,18 was paramount to the state's policy of protecting j\lvenile offenders from embarrassment caused by' such
disclosure.
Testimonial privileges may also
deny a defendant access to crucial
proof to support his defense. In
Roviaro v. United States,19 the prosecutor's refusal to disclose to the
defense the identity of an undercover informer who had taken a material part in a narcotics investigation denied the defendant a fair
trial. The Supreme Court held:
"Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents
of his communication, is relevant
and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege
must give way. "20 However, not all
claims of privilege can be overridden to provide a defendant access to
proof. A witness's assertion of the
privilege against self-incrimination
to refuse to testify for a defendant,
for instance, might not constitute an
impermissible denial of proof. 21
Although this is a controversial subject, the courts generally do not require a prosecutor to confer immunity on a witness in order to provide a defendant access to such testimony.22 On the other hand, judicial
threats or other governmental conduct that induces a defense witness
to refuse to testify can unconstitutionally deny a defendant access to
evidence. Such was the case in
Webb v. Texas,23 where the trial
judge's strong admonition to the
sole defense witness against committing perjury "effectively drove the

witness off the stand," thereby
abridging the defendant's due process right to a fair trial. 24
Absent some showing of materiality, however, the denial of access
to witnesses probably will be upheld. InUnited States v. ValenzuelaBernal,25 the prosecutor immediately deported eyewitnesses to the
defendant's crime without affording
defense counsel an opportunity to
interview them. The Supreme Court
rejected the claim that this conduct
unconstitutionally infringed upon
the defendant's access to evidence.
The defendant cannot establish a
constitutional violation, the Court
said, without "some plausible showing of how [the witnesses']
testimony would have been both
material and favorable to the
defense."26 Since the defendant did
not show any specific prejudice, no
constitutional violation was
demonstrated.
Different and complex problems
are presented by the prosecutor's

14

388 U.S. 14 (1967).
Id. at 23.

15

108 S. Ct. 646 (1988).

13

16 Id, at 655. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12 (court
authorized to exclude testimony of undisclosed alibi witness). See also Note, The Preclusion Sanction - A Violation of the Right to
Present a Defense, 81 YALE L. J. 1342 (1972).
17 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
18 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
19

353 U.S. 53 (1957).

Id. at 60-61. See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (executive privilege);
Matte.r of Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A. 2d 330
(1978) (reporter's privilege). Hut see People v.
Tissois, 72 N.Y. 2d 75, 531 N.Y.S. 2d 228,
526 N.E. 2d 1086 (1988) (Social worker
privilege).
21 United States v. Turkish, 623 F. 2d 769 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981);
United States v. Bowling, 666 F. 2d 1052 (6th
Cir. 1981).
22 See Gershman, The Prosecutor's Obligation to Grant Defense Witness Immunity, 24
CRIM. L. BULL. 14 (1988).

20

23

409 U.S. 95 (1972).

Id. at 98. Prosecutorial conduct alsQ can
interfere with a defendant's right to present
witnesses. See B. Gershman, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 9.10(b) (1985).

24

25

26
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458 U.S. 858 (1982).
Id. at 867.
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denial to the defense of access to exculpatory evidence. A rule of constitutional materiality has developed whereby suppressed evidence
is measured by the extent of its prejudice to the defendant's ability to
present his defense. To be sure,
there is no constitutional requirement that a prosecutor disclose to
the defense all investigatory work
done on a case,27 nor is there a rule
obligating a prosecutor to disclose
his entire file to defense counsel,28
By the same token, the landmark
case of Brady v. Maryland 29 held
that a prosecutor is duty-bound to
disclose to the defense materially favorable evidence. "Evidence is material," the Supreme Court stated in
United States v. Bagley,30 "if there is
a reasonable probability that had
the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." Denying a defendant access to such proof
violates due process regardless of
the prosecutor's good or bad faith. 31
The legal analysis here focuses on
the character of the evidence, not of
the prosecutor.
When a defendant is denied access to evidence because such evidence is no longer available, different considerations come into play
as practical concerns clash with constitutional doctrine. As a threshold
matter, the prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory information generally includes the obligation to
preserve such evidence from loss or
destruction. 32 Illustrative of such
evidence are destroyed handwritten
notes of interviews with witnesses,33
erased videotapes or sound recordings,34 lost blood, sperm, urine, or
other scientific evidence,35 and unretained items found at the crime
scene. 36 If no constitutional duty existed, the disclosure requirement
under Brady v. Maryland would be
an empty formality that could be
"easily circumvented by suppression
of evidence by means of destruction
rather than mere failure to reveal."37
In contrast to the suppression of exculpatory evidence, the prosecutor's
54

good or bad faith in making evidence inaccessible becomes critical.
The Supreme Court in two recent cases has addressed the prosecutor's responsibility to preserve exculpatory evidence for access by a
defendant. In California v. Trombetta,38 the Supreme Court addressed for the first time the prosecutor's
responsibility to preserve favorable
evidence for the defendant's later
use. In Trombetta, law enforcement
officials destroyed breath samples
taken from the defendant and used
in his prosecution for intoxicated
driving. The California appeals
court reversed the conviction, finding that the failure to preserve
evidence used against the defendant
violated due process. The Supreme
Court disagreed. Although a duty to
preserve evidence was not ruled out,
"that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play
a significant role in the suspect's
defense." To meet this standard of
materiality, the Court concluded,
the evidence "must both possess an
exculpatory value that was apparent
before the evidence was destroyed,
and be of such a nature that the
defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other
reasonably available means."39
Last Term, in Arizona v. Youngblood,40 the Court considered the
applicable constitutional standard
when the state fails to preserve
evidence that might be useful to a
defendant. The lost evidence in
Youngblood was clothing worn by
the victim of a sexual attack containing semen stains which the police failed to refrigerate and therefore preserve for subsequent testing.
The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground
that the prosecution had breached
its constitutional duty to preserve
the semen samples so that timely
testing could have been performed,
possibly resulting in the complete
exoneration of the defendant. The
problem in Youngblood, as in
Trombetta, was the absence of the
evidence, thereby requiring courts

to "face the treacherous task of
divining the import of materials
whose contents are unknown and,
very often, disputed."41 Given this
speculative task of measuring prejudice-not the case where exculpatory evidence has been suppressed-the Court held that "unless a
criminal defendant can show bad
faith on the part of the police,
failure to preserve potentially useful
evidence does not constitute a denial
of due process of law."42 Since there
was no suggestion of bad faith on
the part of the Arizona police in losing this evidence, denying the defendant access to such proof was constitutionally of no significance.

Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795
(1972).

27

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111
(1976).

28

29 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See also People v.
Cwikla, 46 N.Y. 2d 434,414 N.Y.S. 2d 102,
386 N.E. 2d 1070 (1979).
30 473 U.S. 667 (1985).

31 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87.
32 California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479,
488 (1984).
Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231
(1961); United States v. Harrison, 524 F. 2d
421 (D.C. Cir. 1975); People v. Paranzino, 40
N.Y. 2d 1005,391 N.Y.S. 2d 391, 359N.E. 2d
981 (1976).
34 United States v. Bryant, 439 F. 2d 642
(D.C. Cir. 1971); People v. Springer, 122
A.D. 2d 87, 504 N.Y.S. 2d 232 (2d Dept.
1986); People v. Saddy, 84 A.D. 2d 175, 445
N.Y.S. 2d 601 (2d Dept. 1981).
35 Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. 333
(1988) (semen samples); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) (breath samples);
Colon v. Kuhlman, 865 F. 2d 29 (2d Cir.
1988) (semen); People v. Allgood, 70 N.Y. 2d
812, 523 N.Y.s. 2d 431, 517 N.E. 2d 1316
(1987) ("rape kit").
33

36 People v. Kelly, 62 N.Y. 2d 514, 478
N.Y.S. 2d 834,467 N.E. 2d 498 (1984); People v. Morgan, 199 Colo. 237, 606 P. 2d 1296
(1980); State v. Oliverez, 34 are. App. 417,
578 P. 2d 502 (1978); People v. Brown, 194
Colo. 553, 574 P. 2d 92 (1978).
37

United States v. Bryant, 439 F. 2d at 648.

38 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
39

40

Id. at 489.
109 S. Ct. 333 (1988).

41 California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 486.
42 Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 337.
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Arizona v. Youngblood is an extremely troubling decision. Cases
involving lost or destroyed evidence
present factors that complicate the
appropriate standard of review, and
courts must balance these factors
against the "over-riding concern
with the justice of the finding of
guilt."43 The first complicating factor relates to the nonexistence of the
evidence. Because the evidence is
not available, it is virtually impossible to measure its exculpatory quality and its probable impa~t on the
jury. Courts therefore mt).st speculate on the exculpatory character
and materiality of such evidence in
weighing the appropriate sanction.
In assessing materiality, some courts
require the defendant to prove that
the evidence would have been exculpatory.44 After Arizona v. Youngblood, however, it is questionable
whether showing that the evidence
is exculpatory even matters, if it
cannot also be demonstrated that
the prosecutor or police acted in bad
faith in losing or destroying the
evidence. This standard can produce serious miscarriages of
justice. 45 Just as with other standards recently imposed by the Supreme Court on police or prosecutorial behavior, showing bad faith
destruction seems virtually imp ossible. 46 Of course, the circumstances
of the loss or destruction might raise
a strong inference of bad faith. 47
Moreover, what does "bad faith loss
or destruction" rea,lly mean? Does it
mean a willful destruction in order
to intentionally prejudice a defendant's rights? Or can reckless or
grossly negligent behavior suffice to
meet the pad faith test? Oth~r
Supreme Court decisions applying
"bad faith" language are equally hnprecise as to its meaning. 48 It should
be noted that state courts are not required to follow this "bad faith"
Youngblood test, but can impose on
prosecutorial and police conduct
much more stringent standards. 49
Another compJicating factor in
cases of lost evidence is the nature of
the sanction to be imposed. Where-

as under Brady a court can remand
for a new trial in which the suppressed evidence can be produced,
such relief is meaningless where
crucial evidence is permanently unavailable. The choice in such cases
often is between affirmance and
dismissal, whkh may explain the
Supreme Court's decision in Youngblood to opt for such a restrictive
standard. Since dismissal is the most
extreme sanction, lesser sanctions
might be adopted, such as excluding
the particular item of prosecution
evidence to which the lost evidence
relates, 50 or giving the jury an appropriate limiting instruction. 51
IronicCilly, under the standard in
Youngblood, courts could affirm a
conviction involving lost evidence
even though the nondisclosure of
that same evidence might under the
Brady v. Maryland standard require
a new trial.
In sum, although a defendant
has a right to present a defense,
gaining access to evidence to prove
that defense may be futile. As we
have seen, constitutional protections for access to evidence often are
nonexistent or of limited utility. The
aspiration of our adversary system
to be a Search for the Truth theoretically may be attainable, but practically may be a mirage.

48 See e.g., United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S.
600, 611 (1976).
49 See Brennan, State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489 (1977). See also People v. Isaacson,
44 N.Y. 2d 511,406 N.Y.S. 2d 714, 378 N.E.
2d 78 (1978).

50 People v. Morgan, 199 Colo. 237, 606 P.
2d 1296 (1980); State v. Oliverez, 34 Ore.
App. 417, 578 P. 2d 502 (1978); People v.
Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641,527 P. 2d 361,117 Cal.
Rptr. 9 (1974).

Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 335;
U.S. v. Quiover, 539 F. 2d 744 (D.C. Cir.
1976).

51

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112.
State v. Oliverez, supra.
45 See Colon v. Kuhlman, supra (valuable
evidence destroyed which, if preserved, could
have absolved defendant).
46 Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982)
(need to show prosecutor's intent to goad
defense attorney into seeking mistrial);
UnitedStates v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977)
(need to show prosecutor intentionally
delayed charging defendant to gain tactical
advantage or for harassment purposes);
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985)
(need to show prosecutor brought charges
because defendants were asserting their
rights).
43
44

See Hilliard v. Spalding, 719 F. 2d 1443
(9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Pollock, 417
F. Supp.1332 (D. Mass. 1976); People v.
Springer, supra; People v. Harmes, 38 Colo.
App. 378, 560 P. 2d 470 (1976).

47
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